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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
M. A. STRAND, dba Strand Electric
Service Company,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.

Case No.
8594

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant will agree that plaintiff's statement of facts
accurately represents part of what plaintiff's witnesses
testified to and part of "'Nhat plaintiff's exhibits show-with
one exception. On pages 6 and 15 of -·the brief plaintiff's
counsel refers to a meeting in Omaha between the plaintiff
and Mr. Dickinson of the defendant railroad and states,
"At that time the railroad company agreed, in substance,
to change the method of compensation in the contract from
a unit price to a cost basis." Plaintiff's counsel refers to
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page 74 of the record. Plaintiff did not testify to that at
all on page 74 of the record, or any other place. The only
testimony as to what was agreed upon in Omaha is found
on page 68 and it is contained in this one sentence, which
begins with line 9: "They agreed at that meeting to telegraph the W a.Iker Bank and advanced some money right
away to keep the job going." That obviously does not constitute evidence of an agreement "in substance," or otherwise, to change the method of compensation in the contract
from a unit price basis to a cost basis. Plaintiff's evidence
is that this alleged agreement to change the payment from
a unit price basis to a cost basis was made between the
plaintiff and a Mr. Prater, an engineer of the railroad, in
Salt Lake City in September 1944.
This is pointed out because the contract (Exhibit 1),
Section 9, provided that any agreements concerning extra
work were to be made with the "engineer," who was a Mr.
Dickinson, and not with a Mr. Prater, or anyone else.
Some significant testimony appearing in the record
and alleged to be fact by the plaintiff, is not recited in
plaintiff's brief. The plaintiff and his son testified to numerous provisions in an alleged oral agreement which were
modifications of the written agreement. According to 'the
plaintiff and his son there was an oral agreement entered
into between the plaintiff and Mr. Prater in Salt Lake City
sometime in September 1944, six years and three months
before the complaint was filed in this case and twelve years
before· plaintiff brought the matter to trial. By this alleged
oral agreement several provisions in the '\Vritten contract
were changed. It is true (but beside· the point here) that
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there is no evidence whatsoever that this Mr. Prate-r had
any authority whatsoever to make or change any agreement
on behalf of the railroad. However, it is claimed by the
plaintiff that Mr. Prater agreed :
" ( 1) That after the job was done, the parties
would sit down together and go over the details and
make adjustment; then the railroad would pay the
insurance and expenses so that the plaintiff would
not lose a dime ( R. 59) . The written contract specified unit prices (Ex. 1, section 2).
"(2) That it would be satisfactory to the railroad if the plaintiff got the job done 'as fast as
possible' (R. 60). The written contract specified
the completion date as July 1, 1944. (Exhibit 1 and
R. 75.)
"(3} That all costs and expenses from the beginning to the end of the job would be paid (R. 60).
There was no such provision in the written contract.
" ( 4) That the railroad would pay plaintiff all
of his losses on the job (R. 61). There was no such
provision in the written contract.
" ( 5) That the railroad would pay the plaintiff
for all depreciation on equipment (R. 61, R. 75).
There was no such provision in the written contract.
" ( 6) That the railroad would pay the capital
expenditures incurred by the plaintiff in connection
with the job, including the payment for trucks, caterpillars and horses purchased for the job (R. 62,
R. 75). There was no such provision in the written
contract.
"(7) That it would be all right with the railroad if the plaintiff finished the job by Christmas,''
(R. 76). The contract specified July 1, 1944, as the
completion dat~
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On page 79 of the record, beginning at line 21, the
court said to plaintiff's counsel:
"You now take the position that the oral agreement was an amendment of the written agreement?"
and plaintiff's counsel answered :
"Yes, that the written agreement was amended
by an oral understanding between the parties."

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE CONSISTENT WITH, AND SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE.
POINT II.
THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN ITS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS
IN THIS CASE.
ARGUMENT
BOTH POINTS INVOLVE THE SAME ISSUE
AND WILL BE ARGUED TOGETHER.
According to the plaintiff's argument in his brief there
is only one issue in this case : Was the court wrong in his
finding of fact No. 4, that "plaintiff's action is founded
on a contract partly in writing and partly oral?" and in
the court's consequent conclusion of law that "Plaintiff's
cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations

.
* * *"
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Plaintiff in his brief does not quarrel with the court's
conclusions of law Nos. 1 and 2 that
"(1) Actions on contracts which are partly in
writing and partly oral are subject to the statute of
limitations covering oral contracts."
"(2) In the State of Utah an action on an
oral contract must be commenced within four years
of the time the cause of action arises."
And there is no debate about the fact that plaintiff's cause
of action arose on January 7, 1945, and that more than four
years elapsed before suit was brought.
The plaintiff admits that when an action is based on
a written agreement which has been materially modified
by an oral agreement so that the agreement sued on is. partly
oral and partly written, the entire agreement becomes, in
contemplation of the limitations laws., an oral agreement.
However, now, in spite of what plaintiff's counsel said at the
time of trial, he contends that his action is based on thewritu
ten contract alone and that the agreement to change the compensation from a unit price to a cost basis was not a modification of the original contract * * *." such as to render the
agreement upon which he sues partly oral and partly written. Plaintiff claims that the change of amount and method
of payment and the change of time of the completion of
the job made by oral agreement, was not an oral agreement
but merely an implementation of Sections 9 and 20 of the
written contract, providing for the procedure to be followed
in connection with "extra work", and plaintiff contends
that evidence aliunde the written contract can be admitted
to reveal the obligation of the· railroad under the written
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contract without rendering the four-year statute of limitations applicable. Plaintiff's counsel claims that all plaintiff asks for in this lawsuit was provided for in the written
contract and that an obligation was immposed upon the
railroad in the written contract to pay what the plaintiff
seeks to recover in this suit.
The defendant will concede that under some circumstances evidence aliunde a written contract may be introduced to illuminate the details of a written contract without turning the written contract into an oral contract within
the contemplation of the limitations laws. The crucial question then is : What evidence may be introduced and for
what purpose?
This requires examination of the cases and authorities
involving the basic proposition of when a written contract
by oral modification is converted into an oral contract in
contemplation of the limitations laws.
53 C. J. S., page 1030, Section 68, dealing with "Contracts Partly in Writing," states as follows:
"Actions on contracts which are partly in writing and partly oral are subject to statutes of limitation covering oral contracts, as are actions on
written agreements which are so indefinite as to
necessitate resort to parol testimony to make them
complete.
"For the purpose of distinguishing between oral
and written contracts, as those terms are used in
the statutes of limitation, a written contract, as defined supra, Section 60, is one which in all its terms
is in writing; and a contract partly in writing and
partly oral is in legal effect an oral contract, an
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action on which is governed, as to the period of
limitation, by the statute governing oral contracts
generally * * *."
17 C. J. S., page 870, Section 379:
"'Vhere a written contract is modified verbally,
the entire contract becomes an oral one."
34 American Jurisprudence, Limitations of Actions,
page 76, Section 92:
"Limitation statutes customarily provide a period, frequently less than that for actions upon written contracts, for the commencements of actions
upon contracts, obligations, or liabilities not founded
upon instruments in writing. As has been noted,
such a provision is applicable if the promise arises
only upon proof of extrinsic facts, or if the agreement must be proved only by evidence aliunde, or
if the liability sought to be enforced is imported into
an agreement from some extrinsic source. It seems
that it also applies if the agreement is partly oral
and partly written."
An annotation found in 129 A. L. R. 604 specifically
treats the situation involved in this case. I quote from page
604:
"Cases collected in this annotation concern the
effect of the necessity of introducing evidence, oral
or written, extrinsic to a written contract, upon the
question whether a given action is deemed to be
upon a 'written contract' or upon a 'writing for the
payment of money or property' within the meaning
of a statute of limitations, or is deemed to be within
the contemplation of any other statute of limitations
* * * This annotation only includes cases in
which there was in existence a written contract between the parties to the action."
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Page 613:
"A majority of the cases upon the point support the rule that an action upon a contract is subject to a limitations statute applicable to oral contracts, rather than to one applicable to written contracts, where evidence extrinsic to a written agreement must be used to show the obligation itself, as
distinguished from detail of the obligation that is
sought to be enforced."
The case of Lugland vs. W. T. Tomlin, 287 S. W. 2d
188, decided in Texas in 1956, is very closely analogous to
the facts in this case. A contractor brought action against
a home owner to recover the amount allegedly due the contractor under the contract for the construction of the home.
The original plans and specifications were contained in a
writt·en agreement, but they were changed to such an extent that a new plan had to be drawn but the specifications
were not rewritten. Oral agreements for changes in the
specifications were relied on. The court held that the contract had become an oral contract and any claim arising
under it was governed by the two-year statute of limitation
rather than the four-year statute applicable to written contracts. This case is convincingly analogous because the
written contract contained a provision with regard to alterations, changes or extra work, and it provided that any
alterations or changes from the plans and specifications
were to be paid for by the owner at the times that the
materials. "vere furnished by the contractor. It was argued
in that case just as plaintiff is arguing here, that the oral
alterations and changes were merly implementations of the
alteration and change provision in the written contract and
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did not change the contract sued upon from a written contract to an oral contract. The court was not impressed by
that argument.
The court said:
"Here the original plans and specifications were
changed to such an extent that a new plan had to
be drawn but the specifications were not rewritten.
Oral agreements for changes in the specifications.
were relied on. Under such circumstances the contract becomes an oral one and any claim arising
under such a contract is governed by the two-year
statute of limitations."
On the question of the claim that the oral amendments
were merely implementations of the written contract, the
court said this :
"Appellee contends that the following stipulation contained in the ~Nritten contract, to wit: 'Any
alterations or changes from plans or specifications
to be paid for by owners at times materials furnished
by contract,' was sufficient to show that the parties
contemplated alterations and changes at the time
the original contract was executed, and is sufficient
to take this case out of the general rule. We cannot
agree.''
It is impossible to find a case more closely analogous to the
one at bar than this Texas case.
In the case of Homire vs. Stratton & T. Company, 164
S. W. 67, (Kentucky, 1914), the original contract sued upon
provided that plaintiff should receive $50 a month as his
compensation under the contract if defendant decided at
the end of six months or sooner to discontinue the agree-
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ment; but if defendant decided after six months to continue
the agreement, the plaintiff's. salary should be $100 a
month, which should apply from the beginning of the
contract.

.

A subsequent oral agreement extended the six months'
trial period and thus created an issue as to how much the
plaintiff should be paid.
It was held that the oral modification rendered the
entire agreement an oral agreement in contemplation of
the limitation-of-actions law.
The court said :
"Periods of limitation are graduated mainly
with reference to the nature and quality of the evidence by which the contract sued upon must be
established. The limitation in this state, for instance,
upon contracts in writing is fifteen years, while
upon oral contracts is but five years. In the one
case there is a permanent memorial of the terms of
the agreement, while in the other, the terms of the
agreement are rendered subject to the uncertainties
of human testimony and to the frail and perishing
nature of parol proof. The modification of a contract in writing by parol agreement of the parties
which goes to a material part thereof, therefore,
should operate to reduce it to the status of a contract
by parol, in determining the applicability of statutes
of limitation, for, when so modified, its entire purport, terms, and construction are rendered subject
to establishment by parol proof in the same measure
as those of a contract entirely by parol. And, in
addition, it is more reasonable that the parol part,
being the more recent expression of the intention of
the parties, should draw to its nature the written
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stipulations of the written contract than that the
written contract should draw to it the new parol
stipulations. Therefore, when by subsequent parol
agreement of the parties a written contract has been
modified in its material parts, the whole contract is
thereby reduced to the status of a parol agreement,
in determining the applicability of statutes of limitations.
"So, whether the extension of time was a mere
modification by parol of the terms of the original
written contract, or whether it created a new contract, discharging the original contract, the fiveyear statute of limitation applies."
In the case of L. Cannaday vs. Martin, 98 S. W. 2d 1009
(Texas, 1936), the defendant agreed in writing to erect
a building for plaintiff. The writing contained no details
as to the size or nature of the building, but plaintiff alleges
an oral agreement had established the size and nature of
the building to be constructed. The plaintiff claimed that
the oral agreement was supposed to have been included in
the written memorandum but was left out by mistake.- The
plaintiff sought reformation of the written instrument to
include the parol provisions of the agreement.
The defendant failed to construct the building, and
the plaintiff sued for damages.
The two-year statute of limitations on oral agreements
had run prior to the commencement of this suit.
The court cited numerous cases holding that an agreement partly written and partly oral is an oral agreement
and then said on page 1013:
"It being admitted that the agreement sued on
was partly written and partly oral, and undisputed
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that more than 31/2 years elapsed from * * *
the date of the breach on which appellees recovered
until * * * the date on which their suit was
first filed, limitations was complete and the cause
of action for damages was barred before the suit
was instituted."
There are numerous cases standing for the general
proposition that when a written contract is modifie~ by
an oral agreement so that the agreement when sued upon
is partly oral and partly written, the entire contract becomes an oral contract. However, inasmuch as this general
principle of law is admitted by the plaintiff, I see no need
to go on burdening the court with the citation of a lot of
cases. The pertinent question here is whether or not the
particular facts in this case are such as to enable the plaintiff to introduce evidence aliunde the contract without so
altering the contract as to make it an oral agreement subject to the four-year statute of limitations.
Let us examine cases where parol testimony has been
admitted to illuminate or implement the obligation under
a written contract and in which the courts have decided
such parol did not convert the written contract into an oral
one. All these cases follow a definite pattern, and the defendant submits that none of them are applicable to the
facts in this case. The crucial factual issue in the case at
bar is when may parol testimony aliunde a contract be
introduced to determine what should be paid under a written contract? All the courts follow the unvarying principle
that the written contract must have set up an objective
standard for payment, which then can and must be observed
and followed in the parol testimony.
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Let us examine the plaintiff's own cases cited in his
brief.
The case of Lewis vs. Taylor, 204 S. W. 383, was decided in 1918 and dealt with an oral change in price of wheat
sold under a written contract. If this 1918 Texas case had
any merit to support plaintiff's theory, it has been comple~ly discredited and vitiated by the 1956 Texas case of
Lugland vs. Tomlin, cited above, which case deals with the
exact type fact situation involved in the case at bar.
The case of Fabian, et al. vs. Lammers, 84 P. 432, is
not in point. In that case a group of adjoining land owners
agreed in writing to build re,spective sections of a levee to
protect all of them against flood. Part of the written agreement read "that the levee to be built by each of the parties
hereto shall be of the same size, height, width, character
and in accordance with the said decision of the aforesaid
George A. Atherton, ci vii engineer * * *"
.
The defendant failed to build his levee, and the plaintiff, one of the parties to the contract, built it for him and
sued him for the amount it cost him. Defendant claimed
that the agreement was partly in writing and partly oral
and therefore the longer statute of limitations was applicable. The court correctly decided that the claim was based
on a contract in writing and held for the plaintiff. This
case is not applicable to the case at bar because in this
Fabia:J, case there w~s no modification of the written agreement
a subsequent oral agreement. The written contract
established an objective standard to be followed in determining the specifications of the levees, to wit: a certain
engineer would make that decision. That objective stan-

t:;'
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dard was followed. The engineer did determine the specifications and the levee was built in accordance therewith.
In the case at bar if the written contract between the
Union Pacific Railroad Company and Strand had said:
"The amount of compensation to be paid Strand will be
determined by Mr. Prater, an engineer," then this Fabian
case would be in point and Prater's decision could be introduced in evidence to show the railroad's obligation and it
would not convert the written contract into an oral one,
but the UPRR Co.-Strand contract did not say that. On
the contrary, it provided its own specific objective standard
by which payment was to be computed, that is, by unit
prices specifically set forth in Section 2 of the contract.
A subsequent oral agreement completely ignored that objective standard set up in the written agreement and substituted an entirely different basis of compensation.
The case of W. T. Rawleigh Company vs. Graham, 103
P. 2d 1076, is not in point. Here the written agreement
provided that the plaintiff would furnish defendant with
products "at current wholesale prices." The defendant
claimed the contract was partly in writing and partly oral
and that therefore the action was barred by the statute of
limitations. The court properly admitted evidence aliunde
the written contract to show what the "current wholesale
prices" were and held the action was based upon a contract
in writing. The words which plaintiff's counsel quotes from
the case in his brief clearly distinguish it from the case at
bar:
"The written contract relied upon by the respondent is complete· and furnished an objective
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standard (emphasis mine) for the ascertainment of
any amount due thereunder from (the principal
debtor) to respondent."
In the Rawleigh case the "objective standard" set forth
in the written contract was followed. In the case at bar
there was an objective standard set up, that is, unit prices;
and Strand could have introduced evidence showing the
number of poles he put in earth, in rock, the number of
feet of wire strung, the number of H fixtures placed and
so on, in order to prove what he was owed if he contended
that he had not been paid the unit prices in accordance with
the contract. In so doing he would not have converted the
written contract into an oral one. But that is not what he
attempted to do. He completely ignored the objective standard provided for in the agreement and he substituted a
cost standard allegedly arrived at subsequently and orally.
Plaintiff's case Lyon, et al. vs. Moise's Executor, 183
S. W. 2d 493, is clearly distinguishable from the information the plaintiff himself has given us in the brief. The
court said:
"If the written contract contains a definite
promise to pay but does not name the amount (emphasis mine), the fact that the amount must be
ascertained by evidence aliunde does not bring the
contract into the category of one partly in writing
and partly oral."
That is true but the reverse is also true. If the contract
does name the amount to be paid as the UPRR-Strand
contract did, then evidence aliunde the written contract cannot be introduced without rendering the contract oral, when
the evidence introduced is based on a method of computa-
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tion entirely different from, and in no way conte·mplated
or authorized by the written contract.
If there had been no provision for amount of payment.
whatsoever in the UP-Strand contract, then this Lyon
case vvould be in point, but since there was a precise payment schedule set forth in section 2 of the written contract, the Lyon case has no applicability.
There are additional facts in the Lyon case which are·
not pointed out by the plaintiff's counsel but which are
significant. It clearly follows "the objective standard" rule
laid down in all these types of cases on which the plaintiff
attempts to rely. There was an objective standard to compute the amount of payn1ent set forth in the written contract
in the Lyon case. The court referred to the Rawleigh case
cited by the plaintiff in his brief and at page 496 the court
said:
"But the court held (in the Rawleigh case) that
the writing contained a promise to pay and 'furnishes an objective standard for the ascertainment of
any amount due thereunder,' and applied the limitation controlling written contracts~ The same may
be said of the writing executed by Moise-the objective standard contained therein is 'I furthermore
agree * * * to reimburse you for usual commissions and any advances made by you for my account.' "
In ascertaining the amount due under the contract,
Lyon, the plaintiff, used the objective standard provided
for in the written agree·ment.
In the case of Brown vs. Irving, 269 S. W. 686, the
same objective-standard situation exists. In exchange for
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surrender of stock by the plaintiff, the defendant agreed to
pay the plaintiff "a sum in cash equal to the difference between $12,500 and the cost of reorganization of said company and in sale of $90,000 par value of the preferred stock
of the company." The reorganization of the company was
effected, the preferred stock sold, and the plaintiff sued
for the difference between the $12,500 and the cost of the
reorganization and introduced extrinsic evidence to prove
the amount of the difference. Here the plaintiff followed
religiously the objective standard for computing the amount
due contained in the written agreement. There was no
subsequent oral agreement modifying the method of computing the amount of payment due. Consequently, this
case has no application to the one at bar.

Streeper, et al. vs. Vic-tor Sewing Machine Company,
112 U. S. 676, is exactly the same situation as the other
cases cited by the plaintiff. The written contract itself
set forth the method used in computing what the sewing
machine consignee was supposed to pay plaintiff sewing
machine. company, and that method was followed by the
company when it sued to recover what the consignee owed
it. The language of the court sets this forth clearly on page
686:
"The objection made is that although the agreement states the shares to which the plaintiff and
the consignees are to be respectively entitled, it fixes
no price on the machines. The, answer to this, is
that the agreement states that the retail prices for
which the machines consigned are sold, as reported
by the consignees, are the prices on which the commissions of the consignees are to be calculated ; and
that the agreement fixes the prices of parts of the
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machines at 40 per cent discount from list prices,
and the prices of attachments at the lowest wholesale rates. By the agreement when the fixed commissions are deducted from the retail prices of
sales, the rest belongs to the plaintiff; and Exhibit
A shows the retail price of each machine sold as
reported by the consignees and how much they retained beyond what they were entitled to retain as
commissions, and Exhibit B shows the price of each
attachment sold to the consignees."
This case therefore, like the others, is not in point.
If the U.P.-Strand written contract had said that the
railroad would pay all Strand's costs in connection with
doing the job, then, of course, under the line of cases submitted by the plaintiff, Strand could introduce his evidence
to show what the job cost him, and it would not convert the
written contract into an oral contract; but, of course, that
is not what the written contract said.
Plaintiff's case Crook Company vs. U. S., 270 U. S. 4,
has nothing to do with this case at all. Of course, change
articles in contracts are legal and enforceable. Of course,
written contracts can be changed by oral amendments and
be binding, but the Crook case involved no problem of the
intervention of the statute of limitations and thus no problem of whether or not the written contract had been converted into an oral contract.
The Utah case of Hardinge vs. EIMCO Corporation,
266 P. 2d 294, also has absolutely no bearing on this case.
The Hardinge case is simply one in which the shipper agreed
in writing to pay the freight charges; and when the shipment arrived without the freight charges having been paid,
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the consignee paid them and then proceeded to recover the
freight charges from the shipper, pursuant to the express
provision of the written contract. There is in the Hardinge
case no subsequent oral agreement whatsoever changing the
provisions of the written contract.
Consequently none of plaintiff's cases support the
theory upon which he attempts to recover in this case.
Moreover, even if plaintiff's theory were legally tenable, his facts do not support his theory. Counsel in his
brief argues that all the plaintiff is attempting to do is
to recover extra money for extra work and that the September oral agreement was simply a computation of the
extra work he had done and the amount over and above the
contract price lie was to get for that extra work. That this
is what the plaintiff was attempting to do is not supported
by the testimony in the record at all. The testimony shows
that if the plaintiff was trying to get extra money for extra
work, that was only a small part of what he was trying to
do. In Mr. Strand's letter to Mr. Dickinson of September
1, 1944, (plaintiff's Exhibit 3), in which Mr. Strand is
asking for help, he names seven items that have caused him
difficulty, and only two of them have anything to do with
extra work. He does not ask for payment for extra work
under Section 9 of the contract. He says: "Thus we find
our reserves for this job used up and beg you to help us
get some financial adjustment so we can finish the contract." He asks for help because (1) the railroad delayed
shipment of equipment, (2) the union raised its pay scale,
(3) his camp cost him more to set up than he had anticipated, (4) a wind storm damaged his camp; and then he
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refers to the two items which might be argued were extra
work: (1) installing extra cross arms, (2) having to build
the line farther away from the track than he anticipated.
This, obviously, is not simply a case in which the plaintiff
seeks extra money for extra work. He seeks to have the
railroad pay him for the entire cost of the job plus "overhead" and a profit without any attempt to segregate what
was extra work or wh'at he was entitled to for that extra
work.
According to the plaintiff Mr. Prater did not merely
orally agree to pay him for extra work but agreed to compensate him for additional cost due to a change in a union
agreement, a wind storm, unanticipated expense due to
railroad's delay in delivering equipment, expense of depreciation of equipment, cost of capital expenditures such as
for trucks, caterpillars and horses, and any and all other
expenses and losses which he incurred. Just what does the
extra-work provision in Section 9 of the written contract
have to do wi.th those items?! It has nothing to do with
them, and plaintiff cannot claim that an oral agreement
to pay all those items is based in any way on Section 9 of
the written contract.
Even if plaintiff's extra-work theory were legally tenable, and even if his theory were supported by the testimony and exhibits of his witnesses, still he could not recover
here because he did not attempt to acquire payment for
extra work in the manner prescribed in the extra-work provisions of the contract. His testimony, if true, is that even
Section 9, the extra-work provision of the contract-the
very section upon which he now relies-was changed by
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oral agreement. The plaintiff failed to comply with four
conditions precedent to collecting for extra work, which
are set forth in Section 9. Section 9 provides that if the
extra work is not "similar" to that contracted for, (1) the
contractor shall submit information concerning the nature
of the same to the engineer before such work is commenced,
(2) it shall be classified as extra work and paid for at prices
to be agreed upon between the engineer and the contractor
prior to the commencement of the same, and (3) in case
the contractor does not present a claim in writing to the engineer on account of dissimilarity in the work by reason of
such change within ten days after such change has been
explained, the contractor shall be forever estopped from
making any clain1 therefor.
The four requirements ignored by the plaintiff are ( 1)
The plaintiff did not submit information before commencing the alleged extra work. (2) The plaintiff did not agree
with anyone as to prices for the extra work prior to the
commencement of the same. ( 3) The plaintiff did not present a claim in writing within ten days after the change
was explained to him, or discovered by him. (4) When he
did achieve agreement (if that's what he did), as to prices
to be paid for the extra work, the agreement was not made
with the "engineer", who was Mr. Dickinson, as provided
in the contract, but the agreement was made with a Mr.
Prater who was endowed with no authority whatsoever by
the written contract.
Now, if plaintiff claims to be entitled to recover for
extra work, he has to take the position that the provisions
of Section 9 itself were modified by a subsequent oral agree-
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ment. He has to take the position that the railroad, by
subsequent oral agreement, waived the above four vital
provisions of Section 9 of the written contract. In fact,
plaintiff's counsel, in his brief, contends that the defendant
did waive those provisions of Section 9 (page 16 of the
brief). If there were any such waiver, that waiver constituted an oral modification which changed material provi-·
sions of the written contract and therefore renders the
entire contract oral in contemplation of the limitations laws.
If the plaintiff were actually just seeking extra pay
for extra work, and if Section 9 of the written agreement
had said "the contractor may do any extra work he desires
to do whenever he desires to do it without any prior consultation with anyone as to its nature or price to be charged
for it, and after the work is done he may make a claim for
it whenever he gets ready and a railroad engineer by the
name of Prater may decide what the contractor is to be
paid for it," then the plaintiff would be entitled to submit
the extrinsic evidence of the alleged oral agreement between
himself and Mr. Prater and it would not convert the written
contract into an oral contract. But, of course, that is not
what the contract said. The provisions in Section 9 were
not just put in the contract to take up space. They were
vital, important provisions that the railroad expected to be
observed. The procedure outlined there was for the very
purpose of attempting to forestall contractors' claims for
extra work that frequently arise after a job is done without the contractors ever having first consulted anyone about
the nature or the cost of the extra work.
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CONCLUSION
In the written contract the railroad did not agree to
pay for (1) capital expenditures, (2) depreciation on machinery, (3) higher wages caused by union contract increases, (4) increased cost of setting up the camp, (5) loss
resulting from a wind storm, ( 6) the total cost of the entire
job, or (7) for extra work unless it wa~ done in accordance
with the procedure set forth in Section 9 of the agreement.
Yet plaintiff claims that in the subsequent oral agreement Mr. Prater agreed to pay him for all of those things.
Still the plaintiff speciously contends there was no material
alteration of the written contract by the oral agreement.
It is very obvious that the alleged oral agreement made
substantial and material changes in the written contractso substantial that, according to the plaintiff, it would increase the defendant's obligation by $94,000 over and above
the payments which defendant's ple'adings alleged were
made to the plaintiff by the defendant, that is, $85,929.80,
(including $5,867.80 in extras agreed upon under the provisions of Section 9) , in accordance with the unit price
arrangements, plus an additional gratuity of $35,927.40 to
get the job finished.
The simple fact is that the plaintiff is asking for
$94,000, plus 12 years' interest, based upon an oral promise
he claims was made in 1944, and plaintiff did not even plead
that any oral promise had been made, or pretend to rely
on any oral promise, until eleven years after his alleged
cause of action arose! The file shows that no oral agreement was alleged by the plaintiff until the filing of his
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amendment to his amended complaint, which was filed
after this trial began! This. he did after defendant's witnesses may be scattered or dead and many of its files on
the matter disposed of.
I cannot conceive a more appropriate case in which
to apply the doctrine and principle of the bar provided by
the statute of limitations.
Respectfully submitted,

BRYAN P. LEVERICH,
M. J. BRONSON,
A. U. MINER,
HOWARD F. CORAY,
MARVIN J. BERTOCH,
Counsel for Defendant
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